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The objective of this study was to explore the participants’ processing strategies on the mere 
exposure effect, object decision priming and explicit recognition. In Experiments 1, we 
observed that recognition and the mere exposure effect for unfamiliar three-dimensional 
objects were not dissociated by plane rotations in the same way as recognition and object 
decision priming. However, we showed that, under identical conditions, prompting analytic 
(part-based) processing at testing produced a large plane rotation effect on recognition and the 
mere exposure effect similar to that observed for object decision priming (Experiment 2). 
Furthermore, inducing a non-analytic (whole-based) processing strategy at testing produced a 
reduced plane rotation effect on recognition and object decision (Experiments 3 & 4), similar 
to that observed for the mere exposure effect. These findings suggest that participants’ 
processing strategies influence performance on the three tasks.  
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 Experimental dissociations between memory measures: influence of retrieval strategies  
 
Experimental dissociations between examples of performance on perceptual tests of implicit 
memory and of performance on explicit recognition tasks have been one of the most 
important data sources suggesting the independence of the mechanisms underlying implicit 
and explicit memory (for reviews, see Schacter, 1987). A very well-documented example 
comes from studies showing that explicit recognition and perceptual priming (i.e., the 
facilitation or bias in the processing of a stimulus as a function of a recent encounter with that 
stimulus) are differentially sensitive to various visual transformations of stimuli between 
study and test times. This kind of cognitive dissociation can be illustrated by studies using the 
paradigm of object decision priming paradigm developed by Schacter, Cooper, and their 
colleagues (Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990). The test task is to judge whether line 
drawings represent possible objects, that could exist in three dimensions, or impossible 
objects, that could not actually exist in the real three dimensional world (Figure 1). 
Participants first study a set of target stimuli, then are tested on studied target and Participants 
and unstudied distracter stimuli. Priming effect is revealed if participants show significant 
increase of performance for studied compared to unstudied test stimuli. By using this 
paradigm, Williams and Tarr (1999) observed that explicit recognition was affected less by 
study-to-test plane rotation than the priming effect (see also Cooper and Schacter, 1992). 
Conversely, reflection, size transformations or depth-rotation of three-dimensional objects 
between study and test have been shown to decrease explicit recognition but not object 
decision priming or implicit performances measured by other perceptual tests (e.g., Cooper, 
Schacter, Ballesteros, & Moore, 1992; Seamon et al., 1997; Seamon & Delgado, 1999).  
A still more striking example is provided by studies of the mere exposure effect with 
very brief presentation at study phase. In these studies, novel visual stimuli are previously 
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shown very shortly (e.g., 1 millisecond, Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980). In a subsequent test 
phase, target-distractor pairs are presented. Participants are asked to select either the old 
stimulus (i.e., explicit recognition) or the more pleasant stimulus (i.e., a judgment that does 
not ask subjects to recollect the prior encoding phase). While explicit recognition was shown 
to be null (i.e., at chance), the old stimuli were much more likely to be selected than the new 
ones in the preference judgment (e.g., Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Mandler, Nakamura, & 
van Zandt, 1987; Seamon, Brody, & Kauff, 1983a, 1983b).  
These studies suggest that different representations with different qualities underlie 
perceptual implicit performance on the one hand, and explicit recognition on the other. For 
example, perceptual priming and the mere exposure effect could be mediated by an enhanced 
“perceptual fluency” underlain by a presemantic Perceptual Representation System (PRS) 
dedicated to capturing information regarding perceptual inputs. In contrast, explicit 
recognition could depend on an episodic memory system, dedicated to coding spatial, 
temporal, contextual or semantic information that creates distinctive representations (Butler, 
Berry, & Helman, 2004; Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990; Seamon, et al., 1997). However, 
in spite of the similarities between the various effects of perceptual implicit memory, 
numerous functional differences have also been observed. Intriguingly, this kind of 
experimental dissociation has mostly attracted less attention within the memory literature. For 
example, Butler et al. (2004) observed that the mere exposure effect was differentially 
sensitive to real words and non-words, with an effect only for non-words, while they found an 
equal priming effect for both words and non-words using a perceptual identification task. 
Similarly, Seamon et al. (1995, 1997) found an mere exposure effect on structurally 
impossible three-dimensional objects (i.e., objects that cannot actually exist in the real world) 
for which an object decision priming was not observed (e.g., Cooper et al., 1992; Schacter & 
Cooper, 1993; Schacter, Cooper, Delaney, Peterson, & Tharan, 1991; Schacter, Cooper, 
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Tharan, & Rubens, 1991; see also Liu & Cooper, 2001; Holbrook, Bost, & Cave, 2003; 
Williams & Tarr, 1997, 1999, however see Carrasco & Seamon, 1996; Ratcliff & McKoon, 
1995). In conclusion, although some evidence is suggestive of a common mechanism 
underlying the mere exposure effect and perceptual priming (see Seamon et al., 1997; Seamon 
& Delgado, 1999), several authors have suggested the possibility that the mere exposure 
effect could be based on a different type of memory representation than the one responsible 
for perceptual priming (Butler, Berry, & Helman, 2004; Seamon et al., 1995). 
Another point of view could offer a quite straightforward explanation by assuming that 
this kind of experimental dissociation does not result from different forms of memory 
representation, but instead from two different forms of processing – analytic or non-analytic – 
applied to the same representations in different tasks (Whittlesea & Price, 2001). An analytic 
form of processing corresponds to isolating some distinctive parts composing a stimulus, for 
example to see whether any of them acts as a cue for recalling the context in which the 
stimulus had been previously encountered. On the other hand, a non-analytic form of 
processing corresponds to examining the stimulus as a whole.  
 Regarding more specifically the dissociation between the mere exposure effect and 
explicit recognition following short presentation at the encoding phase, Whittlesea and Price 
(2001) suggested that, due to the characteristics of the encoding task and the material to be 
processed, people may shift between these different forms of processing under the liking or 
recognition condition. As highlighted by these authors, in most studies of the mere exposure 
effect, the material to be encoded is unfamiliar, encoding opportunities are minimal (i.e., 
presentation is brief), and test items are perceptually similar (e.g., they belong to a single 
stimulus class). In this context, the perceived difficulty of the explicit recognition task would 
encourage participants both to adopt an analytic strategy, which they judge to be more 
reliable, and to attempt to look for distinctive and recognizable details in the items. However, 
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this analytic strategy fails because the rapid presentation prevents the effective encoding of 
such features. Conversely, because participants may perceive the liking tasks as easier and 
purely subjective, they tend simply to process stimuli non-analytically. If the whole stimulus 
generates a feeling of fluency due to stimulus repetition, then this feeling is attributed to the 
most salient or plausible dimension in the environment (i.e., pleasantness in the context of the 
liking task, Seamon, Braudy & Kauff, 1983a, see also Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992, 1994).  
The question addressed by this study is whether these different strategies may also 
explain other experimental dissociations, aside from the mere exposure effect and recognition, 
and in particular the dissociation between the mere exposure effect and object decision 
priming (Seamon et al., 1995, 1997). In this context, one possible interpretation could be that, 
contrary to the liking tasks in the mere exposure effect paradigm, the objectivity and the 
concrete demands of the possible/impossible object-decision task but also the greater 
difficulty perceived by participants motivates subjects to analyze the stimulus into 
components (i.e., an analytic processing). Indeed, in order to isolate the potentially erroneous 
local part of the object, participants could treat each stimulus as a collection of separate, 
possible and impossible, portions. This part-based processing could have two major 
consequences. Firstly, an analytic processing might block the experience of the global feeling 
of fluency. Indeed, Whittlesea and Price (2001) demonstrated that, even when a stimulus is 
presented in the same form as it was encountered earlier, if the participants analyze the 
stimulus into parts at testing, they will not experience enhanced perceptual processing 
fluency. Secondly, analytic processing could lead participants to retrieve different aspects of a 
memory representation than those underlying the mere exposure effect in liking tasks. Indeed, 
in liking tasks participants could base their subjective liking responses simply on the 
experience of global fluency. Whereas, if participants isolated some of the parts of which a 
stimulus is composed to make their possible/impossible object-decision, these parts might act 
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as retrieval cues and ensure access to information associated with critical features. For 
example, a participant who has seen an unfamiliar three-dimensional object may later 
recognize it by remembering that he or she had thought that one of its parts resembled a 
steeple or that this specific portion of the configuration was complex or erroneous (for a 
similar point of view, see McKoon & Ratcliff, 1995; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1995). 
Consequently, it appears that experimental dissociations between the mere exposure effect, 
perceptual priming and explicit recognition do not inevitably involve an explanation in terms 
of different forms of memory representation. Instead, we suggest that the mere exposure 
effect, priming effects and recognition could partially tap into the same use of overall fluency 
impressions. However, some experimental conditions, such as possible/impossible object-
decision tasks and some recognition tasks, may also induce an analytic processing preventing 
a perceptual fluency experience.  
Finally, the mere exposure effect and perceptual priming have often been compared by 
independent studies, which examine one effect or the other, but not both together (see Butler 
et al., 2004, for an exception). This makes it very difficult to compare them, given that 
different procedures and task formats are employed. Therefore, our goal in this study was to 
compare more directly the mere exposure effect and object decision priming with explicit 
recognition memory. More specifically, we first investigated different variables that can 
produce dissociations between both implicit measures or between implicit and explicit 
memory measures (Experiment 1). The first variable was the possible vs. impossible nature of 
objects, which has a differential effect on the mere exposure effect and on object decision 
priming with mere exposure effect for both types of object and object decision priming only 
for possible objects (Seamon et al., 1995). The second variable was a visual transformation 
between study and test times, more specifically, a plane rotation that largely affects less 
explicit recognition than object decision priming (Cooper & Schacter, 1992; Williams & Tarr, 
 8
1999). In the next experiments, we investigated whether these task dissociations could result 
from different processing strategies adopted by the participants by implementing analytic or 
non-analytic instructions (Experiments 2 and 3), and by giving a short response deadline in 
order to prevent the analyze of distinctive information (Experiment 4). 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Object decision, Liking, and Recognition 
Plane rotation between study and test times has been well studied and is said to have a 
larger effect on object decision priming than on explicit recognition (Cooper & Schacter, 
1992; Williams & Tarr, 1999). The goal of our first experiments was therefore to reproduce 
this pattern of data by using the possible/impossible object-decision task (priming; 
Experiment 1A), on the one hand, and the liking task (mere exposure effect, Experiment 1B), 
on the other, using the same material, procedure and task format. If the mere exposure (mere 
exposure effect) and priming effects are based on the same memory representations or 
processes, we might expect to observe that rotation has a similar major impact on the mere 
exposure effect as it does with priming. In addition, we attempted to replicate the differential 
effect of the object type (possible or impossible) on the mere exposure effect and object 
decision priming (Seamon et al., 1995, 1997).  
Method 
Participants: Forty-eight Liège and Geneva University students participated in 
Experiment 1A, and 24 in Experiment 1B. 
Materials: Sixty-four line drawings of unfamiliar possible and impossible three-
dimensional objects were used (see Figure 1, for examples of stimuli). Forty objects came 
from Williams and Tarr (see 1997, for a detailed description of the materials), and 24 objects 
were created for this study respecting the characteristics of Williams and Tarr’s materials. For 
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the evaluation of the clear perception of the nature of possible/impossible objects, 24 
additional participants were asked to decide, without a time limit, whether each of the 64 
objects was possible or impossible. On average, possible objects were classified as “possible” 
by 90% (standard deviation: 5) of the participants and impossible objects were correctly 
classified by 88% (standard deviation: 4) of the participants. In addition, decision accuracy on 
the 24 new objects that we created did not differ from the accuracy of Williams and Tarr’s 
figures and no difference was observed between possible and impossible objects (all Fs < 1).  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Liking judgments can be influenced by many cues other than perceptual fluency, due to 
pre-exposure (such as complexity, Lombardo, 1991; figure-ground contrast, Reber, 
Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; size, Silvera, Josephs, & Giesler, 2002; symmetry, Jones, 
Little, & Perrett, 2003; averageness, Rhodes, Sumich, & Byatt, 1999; etc.). For this reason, 
in contrast to Williams and Tarr (1999), we avoided as much as possible presenting the 
objects from their most canonical views during both the study and test phases in order to 
prevent a potential liking bias. Thus we first asked another sample of 16 participants to 
position each object freely in its most canonical orientation. Then, avoiding these most 
canonical views, six copies of each object were created by plane rotation (0°, ±60°, ±120°, 
or 180°, clockwise: +, counterclockwise: –, see Figure 2). The 64 stimuli were randomly 
divided into two sets (set A and B). Half of the subjects were presented with set A as the 
target and set B as distractors. The other half of the subjects were presented with the 
reverse design. Moreover, both set were divided into 4 groups of stimuli in order to 
counterbalance the stimuli allocated to the four orientations of studied items (0°, ±60°, 
±120°, or 180°) 1.  
 
Material was presented using E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) on 
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a 17” color monitor running at 60 Hz, approximately 50 cm from the participant. The objects 
were about 6 cm high and 6 cm wide, resulting in a visual angle of 6.8°. They were presented 
in gray on black. Our previous work has shown a particularly robust mere exposure effect 
with this material and color format (Willems & Van der Linden, 2006). 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Procedure: Participants were instructed only that the study involved “objects 
perception” and that they would be making judgments and decisions about novel objects. All 
instructions were presented automatically to participants on the computer screen. 
Incidental study tasks: Participants were told that they were going to see figures in the 
context of different judgments. In the first encoding task, participants were requested to 
decide which direction they thought each object was facing (left or right); in the second, they 
had to decide whether the object looked like a building, tool, or spaceship; in the third, they 
counted the number of visible surfaces on the figures; and in the fourth, they rated how 
complex each object seemed on a 5-point scale. We selected this diversified encoding task 
procedure previously used by Williams and Tarr (1999) for two main reasons. Firstly, our 
primary aim (Experiment 1A) was to reproduce the same dissociation between object decision 
priming and explicit recognition that Williams and Tarr had observed, before investigating the 
mere exposure effect (Experiment 1B) and introducing new manipulations (Experiments 2-3). 
Secondly, this diversified encoding procedure aimed to make participants efficiently encode 
part-related and whole-related information. Consequently, the use of both analytic and non-
analytic processing as strategies that can generate information about a stimulus should be 
similarly efficient.  
 Thus participants received 4 trials with the same set of stimuli, but with a different 
judgment task for those stimuli on each trial. They entered their choices using the PST Serial 
Response Box (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). No mention was made of any subsequent 
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memory test or the impossible-possible nature of the figures. Participants were then presented 
with 32 gray-on-black figures (16 possible and 16 impossible), four times each, in four 
random orders of 32. Each study stimulus was presented in the center of the screen for 5-s, 
followed by a 3.5-s interval. Immediately following this study phase, participants received 
instructions for the implicit memory task (Liking or object decision tasks) and the recognition 
judgment task.  
Object decision and Liking tasks: In Experiment 1A, participants were informed that 
some objects represented “three-dimensional objects that could exist in the real, three-
dimensional world,” whereas others represented “impossible objects that could not actually 
exist in the real, three-dimensional world.” Participants were told to decide whether the object 
was possible, yes or no, as quickly and as accurately as possible. Here, the test trials were 
preceded by six practice figures, for which the participants made decisions and received 
automatic feedback. Their understanding of the impossible/possible distinction was checked 
by the experimenter before the beginning of the test phase. In Experiment 1B, participants 
were simply asked to examine each object and to decide whether the object was pleasant, yes 
or no, as quickly as possible.  
Participants saw a random list of 32 studied and 16 unstudied distractor objects. Figures 
were presented until the participant responded or 4-s had elapsed. Each trial began with a 1.5-
s blank screen followed by a 500-ms fixation point. The interstimulus interval was thus 2-s, 
computer-spaced.  
Explicit recognition task: The same items, in the same orientation, as in the implicit 
memory tasks were displayed. Participants were informed that the objects might appear in 
different orientations in comparison with the orientations in the study phase (as in Williams & 
Tarr, 1999). For each figure, participants had to say whether they had seen it before. The 
sequence of trials was identical to that described for the object decision task.  
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Half of the participants were presented with the object decision task (Experiment 1A) or 
with the liking task (Experiment 1B) first and the recognition judgment afterwards. The other 
half of the participants were presented with the reverse design. Participants were tested 
individually.  
Design and analyses: For each experiment, the independent variables manipulated 
among the participants were Type of Object (possible vs. impossible) and Test Status, 
which combined Study Status and Rotation of studied objects (i.e., studied 0°, studied 
±60°, studied ±120°, studied 180°, and unstudied objects). The dependent variables were 
the proportion of correct responses in object decision (i.e., accuracy rates), and the 
proportion of preference and recognition responses for studied objects (Hit responses) and 
for unstudied objects (false alarms, FA). The use of proportion of responses as main 
dependent variable ensured to have very similar measure of memory in the three tasks. 
However, response times (RTs) will also be reported for priming. 
Results and Discussion 
For the various tasks, preliminary analysis revealed that the clockwise/counterclockwise 
rotation condition and task order affected neither the response proportions nor RTs (all Fs < 
1). Importantly, the absence of any effect of task order showed the limited influence of 
explicit recognition on implicit memory tasks. Consequently, we did not consider these 
variables in the following analyses2. 
Experiment 1A (Object decision priming and Recognition): We detailed the rotation 
effects on priming and on recognition separately before to analyze the differences between the 
patterns of rotation effects on the both tasks. To evidence memory effect, a-priori contrast 
tests were computed in order to check whether the proportion of correct responses for targets 
was greater than for never seen distractors. 
In the object decision task, a 5 X 2 ANOVA on correct response proportion (accuracy 
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rates, see Table 1) with Test Status (studied 0°, studied ±60°, studied ±120°, studied 180°, and 
unstudied objects) and Object Type (possible, impossible) showed a significant main Object 
Type effect with an advantage for possible objects (F(1, 47) = 12.13, p = .001) but no other 
significant effect (all Fs < 1.8). The a-priori contrast test nevertheless showed a significant 
priming effect but only for possible objects with 0° study-to-test rotation (F(1, 47) = 8.224, p 
= .006), and not for other possible objects (all Fs < 1.5) or impossible objects (all Fs < 1).  
Regarding RTs for correct responses, we observed a very similar pattern of results with a 
robust priming for possible objects with 0° study-to-test rotation (F(1, 47) = 61.632, p <.001) 
and an absence of priming for impossible objects (all Fs < 1) and for possible objects in other 
Rotation conditions (all Fs < 1)3. These findings were consistent with those obtained by 
Williams and Tarr (1999), who found that large plane rotations dramatically affect priming in 
the object decision task. Indeed, we noted a significant object decision priming on accuracy 
rates (more studied objects classified correctly), but only when objects were in the same 
orientation at the test and study phases.  
In the explicit recognition task, the 5 X 2 ANOVA on “Yes, old” response proportion 
showed a significant main effect for Test Status (F(4, 188) = 53.965, p < .001) but no other 
significant effects (all Fs < 1.5). The a-priori contrast test indicated that participants gave 
more “Yes, old” (Hit) recognition responses to all the studied objects (regardless of Rotation 
and Object Type), than “Yes, old” (false alarm, FA) responses to unstudied objects (all Fs > 
41). However, contrast test on studied objects with both possible and impossible objects taken 
together (weights: studied 0° = –3, studied ±15° = –1, studied ±45° = +1, studied ±90° = +3) 
showed a significant linear Rotation effect on Hit proportions (F = 21.9, p < .001).  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Differences between the patterns of orientation effects in the object decision and 
recognition tasks were addressed with 2 X 4 ANOVA on accuracy for studied objects with the 
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two factors of Task (Object Decision vs. Recognition) and Rotation, leaving out unstudied 
items (studied 0°, studied ±60°, studied ±120°, studied 180°). Because no significant priming 
effects was observed for impossible objects these trials were not analyzed here. The 
interaction of these factors was significant (F(3, 141) = 2.864, p = .04). The same analysis on 
RTs revealed also an interaction between the two factors (F(3, 141) = 6.095, p < .001). These 
interactions indicated that object decision priming and explicit recognition performance was 
differentially sensitive to larger study-to-test rotations. Thus, as observed by Williams and 
Tarr (1999), while recognition performance gradually decreased with rotation amplitude, 
priming disappeared abruptly at the 60° rotation level. This replication indicates that our 
stimuli and procedure are capable of producing the same result pattern of study-to-test 
rotation effects on object priming and explicit recognition observed by previous studies 
(Cooper & Schacter, 1992; Williams & Tarr, 1999).  
Experiment 1B (Liking and Recognition): This experiment was identical to Experiment 
1A, except in the implicit memory task instructions. Thus, we performed the same steps in 
analyzing this experiment.  
In the liking task, the 5 X 2 ANOVA showed a significant main effect for Test Status 
(F(4, 92) = 5.916, p < .001), but no other effect (all Fs < 1.1) (see Table 2). A-priori contrast 
test showed a mere exposure effect for possible objects with 0° and 180° study-to-test rotation 
and a marginal effect with 60° rotation (0°: F(1, 23) = 12.220, p = .002; 180°: F(1, 23) = 
5.173, p = .03; 60°: F(1, 23) = 3.336, p = .08), but no effect for studied possible objects with 
120° rotation (F = .822). Similarly, a significant mere exposure effect was noted for 
impossible objects in the 0°, 60°, and 180° conditions (0°: F(1, 23) = 14.698, p < .001; 60°: 
F(1, 23) = 4.307, p = .049; 180°: F(1, 23) = 11.707, p = .002), but again not for studied 
objects in the 120° rotation condition (F(1, 23) = 2.75, p = .11). Finally, for possible and 
impossible objects taken together, a linear contrast test on liked studied objects showed a 
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marginally significant Rotation effect (F(1, 23) = 3.309, p = .08). Thus, a slight linear decline 
in the mere exposure effect was observed with rotation from 0° to 120°, with no mere 
exposure effect at all for the 120° condition. However, a slight revival in the mere exposure 
effect was noted for 180°-rotated objects. One possible explanation of this result could be that 
the global visual form and position in space of the 0° study version overlap more with the 
visual form of the 180° test version than with that of the 120° test version (e.g., an object that 
is elongated and vertical is still elongated and vertical after a 180° rotation but became 
slantwise after a 120° rotation). Thus, the 180° rotation may affect a whole-image-based 
process to a lesser degree than a 120° rotation (see Marsolek & Burgund, 2005).  
Concerning the proportion of recognition responses, as observed in Experiment 1A, 
the 5 X 2 ANOVA indicated significant main effects for Test Status on response proportion 
(F(4, 92) = 25.636, p < .001, see Table 2). In addition, Test Status did not interact with the 
Object Type effect (all Fs < 1.5). Participants gave more Hit responses than FA responses for 
all Rotations and Object Types (all Fs > 39). In addition, as observed in Experiment 1A, 
contrast tests showed significant linear Rotation effects, for both Object Types taken together, 
on Hit proportion (F(1, 23) = 9.572, p = .002).  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
ANOVA with Task (Recognition vs. Liking), Object Type (Impossible vs. Possible) 
and Rotation condition of the studied object (0°, ±60°, ±120°, 180°) was conducted on the 
proportions of recognition responses and of liked objects. Interestingly, this revealed no 
significant Task × Rotation interaction (F (3, 69) = 2). Unlike in Experiment 1A, we did not 
find an implicit/explicit differential effect created by object rotation between study and test 
times. 
 
Thus, although affected by rotation, the mere exposure effect did not show the same 
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extreme viewpoint dependence that was found in the object decision task in Experiment 1A. 
Indeed, we found a significant or nearly significant mere exposure effect in conditions that 
revealed no priming effect for the same materials (i.e., studied objects with 60° and 180° 
rotations). These findings also confirmed the relative robustness of the mere exposure effect, 
already observed with other stimulus transformations (changes in size or reflection, Seamon et 
al., 1997; depth-rotation, Seamon & Delgado, 1999) but also across different measure 
procedures. Indeed, many previous mere exposure effect studies used a forced-choice test on 
target-distractor pairs, whereas the present research employed a yes/no liking judgment. This 
procedure has been chosen in order to compare object decision priming and mere exposure 
effect with a same task format. Thus, the findings show the robustness of mere exposure 
effect for both possible and impossible objects and for both types of mere exposure effect 
testing. 
To summarize the results of Experiment 1, we first observed a differential study-to-
test rotation effect on object decision priming and explicit recognition (Experiment 1A), 
which was relatively similar to the findings reported by Williams and Tarr (1999). 
Conversely, we noted that study-to-test rotation produced very similar result patterns for both 
the mere exposure effect and explicit recognition (Experiment 1B). Moreover, like Seamon et 
al. (1995), we observed a mere exposure effect for impossible objects, which was not the case 
with object decision priming.  
Non-Analytic and Analytic Strategies  
The results of Experiment 1B are striking when compared with those of Experiment 
1A, in that there was no significant differential effect of rotation on explicit or implicit 
memory tasks when an implicit liking judgment task was used (Experiment 1B), but there was 
one where we asked participants to make object decisions (Experiment 1A). In addition, we 
observed a mere exposure effect but no object decision priming for impossible objects. As 
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explained in the introduction, the results of this first experiment are potentially consistent with 
the view that priming effect (observed in the object decision task) and the mere exposure 
effect (observed in the liking task) recruit at least partially different aspects of the object 
representation in memory. We proposed that, first, an object decision may prompt an analytic 
strategy that consists of scrutinizing each test object as a collection of separate portions. 
Second, this strategy might enable participants to experience fluent reprocessing of the 
stimulus as a whole (Whittlesea & Price, 2001). Third, this strategy might sometimes ensure 
them to retrieve information associated with critical details for the possible/impossible 
decision (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1995; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1995). In accordance with this 
assumption, we noted in these first experiments that object decision response times were quite 
slow overall (between 940 and 1295 ms, depending on the condition, as in Williams & Tarr, 
1999) – slower than liking response times (all Fs > 5; between 897 and 1099 ms depending on 
Object Type). And yet an analytic strategy would likely require more resources and more time 
than a non-analytic strategy.  
However, given that recognition tasks involving unfamiliar and generally similar 
material may lead participants to attempt to isolate distinctive details (i.e., analytic strategy, 
see Whittlesea & Price, 2001), if object decision performance depends on a similar analytic 
retrieval strategy, one would expect to observe a similar rotation effect on these memory 
measures. Conversely, object decision priming was more severely affected by plane rotation 
than by explicit recognition. Moreover, while the mere exposure effect has been described as 
depending exclusively on a non-analytic strategy, we observed a more similar rotation pattern 
between the mere exposure effect and explicit recognition than between object decision 
priming and explicit recognition.  
One explanation might be that, in this study, the object decision task encourages an 
analytic strategy more systematically than does the recognition task. Several factors may 
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support this hypothesis. As regards the mere exposure effect and recognition literature, a 
growing body of research has provided evidence suggesting that participants do not 
systematically perceive fluency due to pre-exposure as a useful cue for their recognition or 
liking decisions (e.g., Verfaellie & Cermak, 1999; Westerman, Miller, & Lloyd, 2003; 
Westerman, Lloyd, & Miller, 2002; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000, 2001a, b; Willems, 
Bastin, & Van der Linden, 2007; Willems & Van der Linden, 2006). In fact, it seems that the 
use of fluency as a cue is subject to metacognitive control and that the relationship between 
the judgment responses and fluency is indirect, mediated by attributional processes (Bornstein 
& D’Agostino, 1992, 1994; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Kelley & Rhodes, 2002) and moderated 
by participants’ assessment of its relevance (Westerman, Lloyd, & Miller, 2002; Westerman, 
Miller, & Lloyd, 2003; Willems & Van der Linden, 2006). These findings may shed some 
light on the role of fluency in the object decision task. Indeed, in this task, fluency seems to 
lead subjects to respond “possible” to both possible and impossible objects that have 
previously studied (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1995; see also, Marsolek & Burgund, 2005; Williams 
& Tarr, 1997). However, in Experiment 1A, even when participants were told to respond as 
quickly as possible, test objects were presented until the participant responded or 4 s had 
elapsed (similarly to Williams & Tarr, 1999). Thus this procedural aspect gave participants 
time to verify their first “possibility” impressions by searching or remembering more critical 
features associated with actual possible and impossible object configurations (see Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 1995). This process strategy could help them make correct decisions about both 
possible and impossible objects. These two influences might explain the absence of object 
decision priming, often observed for impossible objects (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1995). Indeed, 
the bias to respond “possible” to previously studied impossible objects might be offset by the 
availability of specific information that indicates their impossibility (the two processes would 
work against each other). Consequently, when participants are given time to make a decision, 
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fluency due to pre-exposure may be perceived as totally irrelevant, and thus uninformative, 
for object decision judgments. In this context, the perceived irrelevance of the overall a 
fluency-based possibility feeling and the objective requests of the task might encourage 
participants from the outset to adopt almost exclusively an analytic part-based strategy, 
blocking the experience of global processing fluency.  
In line with Ratcliff and McKoon (1995), we therefore assumed that the processing 
involved in non-analytic and analytic strategies might act in concert and influences 
performance in object decisions for possible objects in the same way, but that it has the 
opposite effect on performance for impossible objects (i.e., the analytic strategy acts to 
produce the correct “impossible” answer, while the non-analytic one acts to produce a false 
“possible” response). In this context, we can use the process dissociation procedure developed 
by Jacoby (Jacoby, 1991) that provides measures of specific processes by setting those 
processes in opposition to one another. This procedure ensures to separate the contribution of 
the both processes by a simple calculation. We suggested that “possible” responses for 
impossible objects reflect the influence of non-analytic (N) processing in the absence of 
analytic processing (1 - A). Participants may respond “possible” with a global possible feeling 
but without the isolation of specific information that indicates their impossibility. So incorrect 
“Possible” responses for Impossible objects = N (1 – A). On the other hand, participants might 
correctly respond “possible” for possible objects either because they have isolated and/or have 
retrieved diagnostic details (A), or because non-analytic processing gives a global impression 
of “possible object” (N) without isolating diagnostic details (1 – A). Thus, for these responses, 
A and N processes work together to facilitate the production of the “possible” responses. 
Thus, Correct “Possible” responses for Possible objects = A + N (1 – A). In this context, by 
considering “Possible” responses we can separate the degree to which analytic and non-
analytic processing provides memory cues to contribute to performance in the object decision 
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task. Indeed, A = Possible – Impossible; N = Impossible / (1 – An). A estimation values 
obtained in this way for Experiment 1A data were very high for both studied and unstudied 
objects (means were .68 for studied objects, with all rotations taken together, and .60 for 
unstudied objects) – greater than N estimations (means were .35 for studied objects and .34 
for unstudied objects). Since A for unstudied objects reflects simply a strategic search for 
diagnostic details without any influence of memory (directly available from the test object), 
by subtracting the A estimation for these unstudied objects from the A estimation for studied 
objects, we can obtain an estimation of retrieval processes capitalized by the analytic strategy 
(for studied 0°, ±60°, ±120°, and 180° rotations, .31, .25, .22 and .21, respectively). Similarly, 
since N for these unstudied objects reflects a “possibility feeling” for a reason other than pre-
exposure, (e.g., similarity to a real object encountered pre-experimentally, see Marsolek & 
Burgund, 2005), by subtracting N estimations for unstudied objects from N estimations for 
studied objects, we can obtain an estimation of the perceptual fluency effect capitalized by the 
non-analytic strategy (.07, .11, .08, and .11, respectively). We computed an ANOVA with 
these Strategic Memory use estimations (A vs. N) and studied object Rotation in these 
Experiment 1A data. In line with our hypotheses, this analysis revealed a significant 
advantage for A estimation over N estimation, suggesting that the object decision task in this 
study involved more A-based memory responses than N-based memory responses (F(1, 47) = 
7.64, p = .008). Furthermore, we observed a significant Strategy × Rotation interaction (F(3, 
144) = 3.124, p = .03), indicating a linear Rotation effect on A-based memory estimation (F(1, 
47) = 5.974, p = .02) but not on N-based memory estimation (F = 1.4).  
Another complementary explanation of the dissociation between object decision 
priming and explicit recognition might be that the analytic strategy leads to different forms of 
strategic control over retrieval under both conditions. First, with the explicit recognition 
instruction, participants were informed of the rotation manipulation and could attempt to 
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recognize objects by applying intentional mental rotation. The standard finding with mental 
rotation is that response times increase linearly with increasing rotation distance (Shepard & 
Cooper, 1982; Tarr, 1995), as was observed in recognition response times in our two 
experiments. During the object decision task, participants received no information about 
either rotation manipulation or prior episodes. So the principal purpose of analytic, part-based 
processing in this task is likely to be the simple search for relevant features directly available 
from the test object, and not the retrieval of the prior experience. In this context, parts of 
objects might “accidentally” act as valid retrieval cues, but perhaps only when the study and 
test versions are very similar. In this case only, this strategy might induce unintentional 
conscious remembering of discriminating details. In addition, the diversified encoding tasks 
used ensure that the objects can be encoded in many different ways, with many kinds of 
encoded information, access to which might be affected differently by object transformations 
at the test time. Although the explicit component of object decision priming might depend 
only on retrieval of the specific local configurations associated with whether an object is 
possible or impossible, recognition tasks might depend on this same information but also on 
other aspects of the encoded representation object, such as semantic elaborations (e.g., “This 
object looks like a spaceship.”).  
To summarize, we proposed that first, participants might perceive a non-analytic 
strategy as unreliable for object decisions. Thus, in this study, we assumed that the object 
decision task would motivate participants to focus on specific, local aspects of the stimulus to 
a greater extent than would the recognition task and, above all, that the liking judgment would 
do this. In addition, this part-based strategy, at least when it causes an unintentional or 
involuntary remembering of some aspect of prior episodes, seems more view-dependent than 
a whole-based memory strategy, as suggested by the mere exposure findings. In order to 
further test this hypothesis, we decided to examine the influence of retrieval strategy on the 
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liking, recognition and object decision conditions, from the same perspective as Whittlesea 
and Price (2001) or Ratcliff and McKoon (1995). Through these manipulations, we hoped to 
show that global and analytic strategies were responsible for the differential experimental 
manipulation (i.e., rotation and object type) effects. Our first step in this direction was to 
focus on the mere exposure effect and explicit recognition in Experiment 2. An immediate 
implication of our account is that we would have expected to replicate the view-independent 
performance by implementing instructions that encourage the use of a non-analytic strategy 
(Experiment 2A) and to reverse the pattern of results by using instructions that prompt an 
analytic strategy (Experiment 2B). 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Global / Analytic Liking and Recognition 
In Experiment 2A, we used Whittlesea and Price’s recognition instruction in order to 
induce non-analytic processing of the stimuli during the recognition judgment, thereby 
allowing participants to capitalize on the fluency advantage for studied objects over unstudied 
ones. We presented study and test stimuli in the same way as in Experiment 1. However, at 
the test phase, we falsely informed participants that none of the objects had been presented at 
the study phase, but that some items resembled studied items. In addition, participants were 
warned that these globally similar test items did not possess all the same distinctive parts as 
the related studied items. Thus, for each object, participants simply had to say whether yes or 
no, the object resembled an object they had seen before. In Experiment 1, participants had 
been able sometimes to attempt to isolate some distinctive parts composing a stimulus to see 
whether any of them acted as a cue for recalling details of the context in which the stimulus 
had previously been encountered. In this experiment, because they were falsely informed that 
these parts had been modified between the study and test phases, one would assume they 
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would not attempt to isolate them. Indeed, this global resemblance instruction developed by 
Whittlesea and Price is intended to prompt participants to process items non-analytically 
because of their global similarity, and to experience a global feeling of fluency.  
In Experiment 2B, participants received the same instructions as in Experiment 2A. 
However, for each “Yes, the object is pleasant” or “Yes, the object resembles one I saw 
before” response, participants were also instructed to justify their responses by pointing to the 
part of the objects which they thought was particularly pleasant or particularly similar (see 
Whittlesea & Price, 2001). As regards recognition, we assumed that in Experiment 1, analytic 
and non-analytic strategies might both be used not exclusively, but perhaps alternately. The 
analytic instructions could constitute one factor triggering exclusive use of part-based 
processing. If this instruction caused participants to process the stimuli analytically, and if 
analytic processing causes participants to experience less enhanced fluency, we should expect 
to observe a greater rotation effect on both recognition and mere exposure effect like for 
object decision priming in Experiment 1A. 
 
Method 
Twenty-eight undergraduate students from the University of Liège participated in Experiment 
2A, and 28 in Experiment 2B. The materials and design were similar to those used in 
Experiment 1 except for Whittlesea and Price’s recognition instructions, as explained above4. 
In Experiment 2B, the test objects were divided by a vertical and a horizontal line forming 
four quadrants. For each each “Yes, the object is pleasant” or “Yes, the object resembles one I 
saw before” response, participants were asked to justify their response by pointing to the 
quadrant that either seemed to be most similar (recognition task) or that made that stimulus 
particularly pleasant (liking task) in order to induce analytic processes. 
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  Results and Discussion 
Experiment 2A (Liking and Global Recognition): This experiment was identical to 
Experiment 1 except in the recognition instructions. Thus we performed the same steps in 
analyzing this experiment. 
In the liking task, the 5 X 2 ANOVA showed a significant main effect for Test Status 
(F(4, 108) = 3.340, p = .01), but no other effect (all Fs < 1), similarly to Experiment 1B (see 
Table 3). The a-priori contrast test again showed that participants again gave significantly 
more liking responses for studied objects with 0°, 60°, and 180° study-to-test rotations than 
for unstudied objects, (all Fs > 4.5), but no significant mere exposure effect was observed for 
possible or impossible objects with a 120° study-to-test rotation (all Fs < 1.6). We again 
observed a marginal linear rotation effect (F(1, 27) = 2.915, p = .09). Thus we replicated the 
findings of Experiment 1B.  
Concerning the proportion of recognition responses, the 5 X 2 ANOVA showed a 
significant main effect for Test Status on response proportion (F(4, 108) = 4.5, p < .01). This 
effect indicates a selection advantage for studied (Hits) over unstudied objects (FAs) in all 
Rotation and for the both Object Types (all Fs > 22) but, in contrast to Experiment 1, no 
significant linear rotation effect was noted on the proportion of Hit responses (F= .008). 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
An ANOVA with Task (Recognition vs. Liking), Object Type (Impossible vs. 
Possible) and Rotation condition (0°, ±60°, ±120°, 180°) was conducted on the proportions of 
recognition responses and of liked objects and revealed no significant interaction involving 
Rotation and Task (all Fs < 1), as in Experiment 1B.  
Combined analysis of Experiments 1A and 2A: In order to find out whether 
recognition instructions significantly influenced the patterns of recognition performance, we 
computed an ANOVA on the recognition data from both experiments, including Object Type 
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and Rotation as the within-subjects variable and type of recognition Instructions (Standard vs. 
Global) as the between-subjects variable. This analysis revealed a significant Type of 
Instruction × Rotation interaction on Hit response proportion (p = .05), showing that non-
analytic instructions made recognition less sensitive to the effect of rotation. 
Experiment 2A (Analytic Liking and Analytic Recognition): For the proportion of liked 
objects (see table 4), the 5 X 2 ANOVA showed a significant main effect for Test Status (F(4, 
108) = 3.992, p = .005), but no other effects (all Fs < 1). In addition, the a-priori contrast test 
showed that participants produced significantly more liking responses for studied than 
unstudied objects only in the case of studied objects with 0° study-to-test rotation (for both 
object types, all Fs > 4.7). No significant mere exposure effect was observed for other rotation 
conditions (all Fs < .1). The results of Experiment 2B are very different from those of 
Experiments 1B and 2A. Indeed, it seems that the analytic liking instructions induced a 
rotation effect pattern very similar to that observed for the object decision priming in 
Experiment 1A. 
Regarding explicit recognition, the 5 X 2 ANOVA showed a significant main effect 
for Test Status on the proportion of recognition responses (F(4, 108) = 30.569, p < .001), with 
a selection advantage for studied (Hits) over unstudied objects (FA) (all Fs > 7). A linear 
rotation effect was observed on Hit response proportions and on Hit RTs, for both Object 
Types taken together (all Fs > 15).  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The ANOVA with Task, Object Type and studied objects Rotation was performed on 
the proportion of Hit recognition responses and liked studied objects and revealed a 
significant Task × Rotation interaction (F(3, 78) = 4.035, p = .01). This interaction indicated 
that, although analytic recognition was greatly affected by Rotation, the mere exposure effect 
was slightly more dramatically impaired.  
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Combined analysis of Experiments 1A and 2B: The results of Experiment 2B are very 
different from those of Experiments 1B to 2A, especially for the mere exposure effect. Indeed, 
it seems that the analytic liking instructions induced a rotation effect pattern very similar to 
that observed for the object decision priming in Experiment 1A. Consequently, in order to test 
directly the similarity of the effect of rotation on object decision priming and the mere 
exposure effect, we conducted an additional ANOVA on response proportion for the studied 
possible object data from both experiments (Experiment 1A and 2B) with Task (implicit vs. 
explicit) and Rotation condition as the within-subjects variable and Type of implicit measure 
(object decision vs. analytic liking) as the between-subjects variable. This analysis revealed a 
significant Task (implicit vs. explicit) × Rotation interaction (p = .003), but no significant 
interaction between the three factors (F = 1.5), showing that the differential rotation effects on 
implicit and explicit tasks were very similar in Experiments 1A and 2B. Although statistical 
comparisons could be an incomplete means of comparison, these results are consistent with 
the view that the discrepancy between object decision priming and the mere exposure effect 
results from a different strategic use of distinctive detail retrieval and global fluency.  
In order to find out whether recognition instructions significantly influenced the 
patterns of recognition performance, we computed ANOVAs on the recognition data from 
both experiments, including Object Type and Rotation as the within-subjects variable and 
type of recognition Instruction (standard vs. analytic) as the between-subjects variable. This 
analysis revealed a significant Type of Instruction × Rotation interaction on Hit response 
proportion (F (3, 147) = 3.297, p = .02). The interaction on Hit response proportion showed 
that the analytic instructions made recognition more sensitive to the effect of rotation. Thus, 
non-analytic instructions reduced the influence of study-to-test rotation on recognition 
performance, and analytic instructions accentuated this influence. Nevertheless, analytic 
instructions produced less striking performance changes with explicit recognition than with 
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the mere exposure effect. One first potential explanation could be that from the outset, the 
recognition condition prompts to some degree an analytic strategy, whereas the liking 
condition induces more exclusively a non-analytic strategy and thus would be more affected 
by analytic instruction. One second potential explanation could be that, with the explicit 
recognition instruction but not with the liking task, participants were informed of the rotation 
manipulation.  
In Experiments 1 and 2, the mere exposure effect seems based on a kind of processing 
that generates memory information that is relatively resistant to study-to-test rotation. These 
findings clearly differ from the result pattern obtained by giving instructions that prompt an 
analytic strategy (Experiment 2B); here, the main finding was that the mere exposure effect is 
severely impaired by object rotation, since we observed a significant mere exposure effect 
only when objects were in the same orientation at the test and study phases, as was observed 
for object decision priming in Experiment 1A. This similarity of results for analytic mere 
exposure effect and object decision priming might confirm that the view-dependence of object 
decision priming is dependent on an exclusive use of an analytic approach. In order to test 
further this strategy hypothesis, we decided to induce the global retrieval strategy by 
instructional control in the object decision task in the next experiment. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Global Object decision and Recognition 
In this experiment, we used exactly the same procedure as in Experiment 1A. 
However, participants were warned at the test that some test items were similar in appearance 
to objects seen during the study phase but that some of these similar objects did not possess 
all the same critical features underlying the possible/impossible nature of the objects. In other 
words, we erroneously informed participants that objects that had been presented in the study 
phase in a possible version would sometimes be presented in an impossible version in the test 
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phase, and vice versa. In Experiment 1A, participants might have attempted to respond to the 
object decision demand by more frequently using analytic processing, which could give them 
access to information that might operate as a cue for recalling relevant information (such as 
possible/impossible discrimination spontaneously performed during the encoding phase, 
Marsolek & Burgund, 2005). In this experiment, because they were falsely informed that 
these distinctive features had been modified, they were not expected to attempt to retrieve 
them. Regarding the recognition task, participants simply had to say whether, yes or no, the 
object resembled an object they had seen before, as in Experiment 2A. 
Method 
The materials and design were similar to those used in Experiment 1A except for the 
object decision and recognition instructions, as explained above. Thirty undergraduate 
students from the University of Liège acted as volunteers.  
Results and Discussion 
With regard to correct responses in the object decision task (see Table 5), the 5 X 2 
ANOVA showed a significant main effect for Object Type with an advantage for possible 
objects (F(1, 29) = 15.808, p < .001), a significant Test Status × Object Type interaction (F(4, 
116) = 3.742, p < .006), but no Test Status effect (F = .21). The a-priori tests indicated 
significant priming on accuracy rates for possible objects whatever the study-to-test rotation 
(all Fs > 6.1). Secondly, we observed that participants gave significantly less accurate 
responses for studied impossible objects than for unstudied ones in the 0° condition (F(1, 29) 
= 4.592, p = .04), and a very slight effect was observed in the 60° condition, although not 
significantly (F(1, 29) = 2.922, p = .098). There was no significant effect in other conditions 
(all Fs < 1.7). Finally, we noted no significant linear effect of Test Status on the proportion of 
correct responses for either possible or impossible objects (all Fs < .5). Regarding RTs for 
correct responses, we observed a priming effect for possible objects in the 0°, 60° and 180° 
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rotation conditions (all Fs > 4.6). Nevertheless, we did not observe a priming effect for 
impossible objects (all Fs < 1.5). No priming was noted for possible objects with 120° 
rotation (F = 0.4). Finally, contrast tests showed no significant linear rotation effect on RTs 
for both possible and impossible objects taken separately (all Fs < .5)5. 
In order to examine whether this non-analytic priming task involves distinctive detail 
retrieval (capitalized by the analytic strategy) more than fluency influence (capitalized by the 
non-analytic strategy) as in Experiment 1A, we calculated the contribution of these two 
strategy-based memory responses using the process dissociation procedure described earlier. 
We computed ANOVAs with the two kinds of Strategic Memory use estimation (A vs. N 
estimations) and the Rotation condition on studied items. Unlike Experiment 1A, this analysis 
revealed that A estimations did not have a significant advantage over N estimations (F =.001; 
for studied 0°, ±60°, ±120°, and ±180°, respectively; A estimations were .23, .17, .16 and .15; 
N estimations were .16, .19, .19, and .18). Nonetheless, this result also suggested that our non-
analytic object decision instructions did not completely eliminate the contribution of 
distinctive detail retrieval to performance. The reason was that participants probably adopted 
an analytic strategy not principally intentionally to remember information from prior episodes 
(that was prevented by the analytic instructions) but simply in order to search for critical 
features directly available from the test object. Consequently, even if the global object 
instructions reduce the reliance on analytic processing, they do not totally suppress the 
perceived usefulness of this strategy to participants in the object decision task. Finally, we 
again observed a slight linear rotation effect on A estimation (F(1, 31) = 3.517, p = .07) but 
not on N estimation (F = .12). Thus, these results support the assumption that the difference in 
the rotation effect between the mere exposure effect and object decision priming results from 
the use of different strategies to perform the object decision and the liking task. We therefore 
suggest that the large rotation effect observed in Experiment 1A and the absence of priming 
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for impossible objects (Experiment 1A) result from using an analytic strategy. 
With regard to responses in explicit Recognition, ANOVAs showed only a significant 
main effect of Test Status on the proportion of recognition responses (see Table 5) 
(respectively, F(4, 116) = 31.199, p < .001; other effects, all Fs < .5). This effect indicates a 
selection advantage for studied (Hits) over unstudied objects (FAs) in the case of all studied 
objects, whatever the Rotation or the Object Type (all Fs > 34.0), but no significant linear 
rotation effect (F < 1). 
INSERT TABLE5 ABOUT HERE 
Differences between the orientation effect on object decision and recognition tasks 
were evaluated by 2 × 4 ANOVA (Task × studied object Rotation × Object Type). This 
analysis revealed a main effect for Object Type and a Task × Object Type interaction (all Fs > 
9.1), but no significant interaction between Task and Rotation conditions, or any other effects 
(all Fs < .5). Thus, unlike in Experiment 1A, these findings showed that the effect of rotation 
on the object priming effects and recognition was very similar. 
Thus we noted significant object decision priming and recognition whatever the study-
to-test rotation. Secondly, participants gave significantly less accurate responses for studied 
impossible objects than for unstudied ones in the 0° condition (F(1, 29) = 4.592, p = .04), and 
a very slight effect was observed in the 60° condition, although not significantly (F(1, 29) = 
2.922, p = .098). 
In conclusion, it appeared in Experiment 3 that non-analytic instructions in the object 
decision task strikingly reduced the differential effect of rotation on explicit recognition and 
object decision priming. However, it seems that analytic processing use is still significant. 




Object decision and Recognition with Deadline 
We attempted to eliminate analytic processing by imposing a deadline procedure 
similar to that proposed by Ratcliff and McKoon (1995, Experiments 2 and 3; see also 
Williams & Tarr, 1997). Our reasoning was that analytic processes requiring more resources 
than global processing could be slower by comparison and thus short response periods would 
potentially prevent participants from searching for specific information, but would prompt 
participants to use a simple global impression.  
Method 
Thirty-two University of Liège undergraduate students participated in Experiment 4. 
We used the same stimuli and procedure as in Experiment 1A. At the beginning of the 
experimental session, participants were given practice in responding to a deadline. For this 
practice, 50 pictures of faces (25 women and 25 men) were displayed, one face at a time, on 
the screen. Participants were asked to decide on the sex of each face. A row of asterisks was 
displayed underneath the faces for 600 ms. Participants were instructed to try to respond 
based on their first impression as quickly as possible before the asterisks disappeared.  
After the sex-decision practice session, the study phase for the three-dimensional 
objects was presented, followed by the test phase, as in Experiment 1A. The test trials were 
preceded by six practice objects in order to familiarize participants with the 
possible/impossible discrimination task; they made decisions and received oral feedback. 
Then there were twelve more practice objects with asterisks that were displayed underneath 
the object for 600 ms in order to train subjects again to respond on their first impression 
within this period.  
Results and Discussion 
Differences between the effect of orientation on object decision priming and 
recognition were evaluated by an ANOVA with Task, Object Type and Rotation condition on 
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the proportion of correct responses for studied objects. Except for a main effect for Object 
Type, and an Object Type × Task interaction (all Fs > 25), this revealed neither significant 
interaction between these tasks and the Rotation condition, nor any other effect (all Fs < 1).  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
For the object decision task, an ANOVA showed a significant main effect for Object 
Type, with a significant advantage for possible objects (F(1, 31) = 101.496, p < .001) and a 
Test Status × Object Type interaction (F(4, 124) = 6.870, p < .001), but no main effect for 
Test Status (F = 0.2). Interestingly, significant priming on accuracy rates (i.e., more correct 
responses for studied objects than for unstudied distractors) was noted for possible objects in 
all rotation conditions (all Fs > 6). Conversely, we observed that the probability of giving an 
incorrect response to an impossible object (i.e., responding “possible” to an impossible object) 
was increased by previous study in all rotation conditions (i.e., there were significantly fewer 
accurate responses for studied objects than for unstudied distractors; all Fs > 8.8). Finally, 
contrast tests showed no significant linear Rotation effect on the proportion of correct 
responses for both possible and impossible objects (all Fs < .3).  
Furthermore, with the deadline, the tendency to respond “possible” was significantly 
greater for impossible than for possible objects. Indeed, the proportion of “possible” 
responses were .74 and .64 for 0° studied and for unstudied possible objects, and the 
proportion of incorrect “possible” responses were .45 and .32 for 0° studied and for unstudied 
impossible objects (mean difference between 0° studied and unstudied objects: respectively, 
.13 and .10, F(1, 31) = 270.538, p < .001). In Experiment 1A, without a deadline, some 
analytic processes might have influenced the decision-making process: the tendency to 
respond “possible” was .03 for impossible and .09 for possible objects (although not 
significantly so) in the 0° condition, in which a priming effect was observed. In addition, 
participants made significantly more “possible” responses with a deadline than without one 
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(F(1, 74) = 9.954, p = .002).  
 Consequently, in order to highlight the fact that the priming task with a response 
deadline involves less critical or contextual information retrieval (capitalized by the analytic 
strategy), we again calculated estimations of the analytic and non-analytic access of memory 
cues by the dissociation procedure described above. We computed an ANOVA with these 
kinds of strategic processing (A vs. N estimations) and Rotation on studied objects. Unlike in 
Experiments 1A and 3, this analysis revealed a significant advantage for N estimations (non-
analytic, fluency-based memory responses) over A estimations (analytic, distinctive-part-
based memory responses). For studied objects with 0°, ±60°, ±120° and 180° rotation, 
respectively, A estimations were: .13, .14, .13 and .07; N estimations were: .23, .22, .21, and 
.21 (F(1, 27) = 9.469, p = .004). The deadline procedure thus seems to reduce sufficiently the 
use of analytic memory cues. In addition, we again observed a rotation effect on A estimations 
(F(1, 27) = 4.65, p = .04) but not on N (F = .309).  
For the proportion of recognition responses, an ANOVA showed a significant main 
effect for Test Status (F(4, 124) = 30.084, p < .001) but no other significant effect (all Fs < 
1.1). Contrast tests showed no significant linear effect of Test Status on the proportion of Hit 
responses for either possible or impossible objects (F < 1.5).  
Thus, we observed that the deadline procedure increased the tendency of the non-
analytic instruction effect with, on the one hand, a striking reduction in the differential effect 
of rotation on explicit recognition and object decision priming, and on the other hand, more 
‘possible’ responses for studied impossible objects than for unstudied ones.  
General Discussion 
In this study, we have shown that participants in liking and object decision tasks, but 
also in recognition tasks, may adopt different decision strategies that determine the precise 
way in which prior encounters with stimuli influence current performance. We proposed that, 
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in the liking task, by default, participants would adopt to a large extent a non-analytic strategy 
whereby processing fluency is experienced and attributed to liking (producing a mere 
exposure effect, Whittlesea & Price, 2001). On the other hand, we assumed that in the object 
decision task – at least when participants could take some time to respond – they would 
preferentially choose an analytic strategy in which the stimulus is analyzed into components. 
Finally, analytic and non-analytic strategies might be used in synergy in recognition tasks.  
In the context of a recognition task, the analytic strategy determines whether part of 
the stimulus acts as a cue for recalling details of the context in which the stimulus has been 
previously encountered. On the other hand, in the context of an object decision task, this 
strategy might consist of a simple strategy in an attempt to isolate one stimulus component to 
see whether any of them constitutes a possible or impossible configuration. Whatever the 
purpose of this kind of strategy, the resulting part-based processing at the time of testing 
seems to block the experience of a global feeling of fluency (as demonstrated by Whittlesea & 
Price). We therefore assume that these different strategies, suggested by Whittlesea and Price, 
may potentially account for the number of dissociations observed in the literature between the 
mere exposure effect and recognition (e.g., Bonnanno & Stilling, 1986; Kunst-Wilson & 
Zajonc, 1980; Mandler, Nakamura, & van Zandt, 1987; Seamon et al., 1995, 1997); between 
the priming effect and recognition (e.g., Cooper et al., 1992; Hamann & Squire, 1997; 
Schacter, Copper, & Delaney, 1990; Stark & Squire, 2000; Wagner et al., 1997, 1998); and 
also between priming and the mere exposure effect (e.g., Seamon et al., 1995; Butler, Berry, 
& Helman, 2004).  
We provided direct experimental evidence of the fundamental role of the strategies 
employed in such tasks. In Experiment 1, we found that a prior encounter with the objects 
affected recognition, liking and object decision tasks differently when the objects were 
subjected to study-to-test rotation. More specifically, while significant object decision 
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priming was not observed for larger orientation differences (i.e., studied object with ±60°, 
±90°, ±120°, or 180° study-to-test rotation), recognition performance continued to decline 
gradually following 60° through 180° orientation shifts and, although slightly reduced by this 
stimulus transformation, a significant mere exposure effect was also observed following ±60°, 
±90°, and 180° study-to-test rotation. Moreover, in contrast to object decision priming, we 
observed a significant mere exposure effect (like Seamon et al., 1995, 1997) and explicit 
recognition for impossible objects. Taken alone, this result could support the notion that 
different types of memory representation are responsible for performance in these three tasks. 
Instead, we explored an account whereby enhanced perceptual fluency (which can be 
experienced even for rotated studied objects) might be used when people adopt a non-analytic 
strategy in all three tasks, whereas the remembering of distinctive detail (which could be more 
sensitive to study-to-test rotation), could be used to make possible object, liking or 
recognition decisions when people adopt an analytic strategy.  
We tested this account by implementing analytic or non-analytic instructions 
(Experiments 2 and 3), and by giving a short response deadline in order to prevent the 
retrieval of distinctive information (Experiment 4). Taken together, the results of these 
experiments support our hypothesis: when a non-analytic strategy was experimentally 
prompted for explicit recognition and object decision priming, we found a relatively similar 
tendency in all three tasks, with an overall lesser impact of study-to-test rotation and with a 
pre-exposure effect on decisions about impossible objects. Conversely, when an explicit 
analytic strategy was induced for explicit recognition and mere exposure effect, we found an 
impact of rotation on the mere exposure effect very similar to that observed for object 
decision priming, and explicit recognition was also slightly more affected. These findings 
support the notion that analytic and non-analytic processing are two strategies for processing 
stimuli that can used in both implicit and explicit tasks and that can generate qualitatively 
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different memory cues (Whittlesea & Price, 2001). In addition, this result suggests that, 
although analytic and non-analytic strategies may be used in synergy as they probably were in 
this study under recognition condition (in which strategy manipulation affected performance 
to a lesser extent), the simplicity and subjectivity of the liking task might motivate people to 
adopt preferentially a non-analytic heuristic that recruits few resources. Conversely, the 
objective nature of the task, and also the perceived irrelevance of fluency as a cue for the 
possibility decision, might prompt people to adopt a part-based processing strategy more often 
in the object decision task condition.  
Moreover, these results corroborate the notion introduced by Ratcliff and McKoon 
(1995) that object decision priming is largely “contaminated” by specific information retrieval 
(see also, Marsolek & Burgund, 2005; Williams & Tarr, 1997). Indeed, by introducing 
manipulations that can eliminate analytic strategy and thus these retrieval processes, we 
obtained a strikingly different performance pattern. More specifically, we used non-analytic 
object decision instructions that falsely informed participants that retrieving information about 
prior episodes would not be useful (Experiment 3). As a result, firstly, an object decision 
priming effect appeared for impossible objects (in the sense that participants showed a 
tendency to incorrectly respond “possible”) and secondly, object decision priming was less or 
not at all affected by large study-to-test orientation shifts, as observed for the mere exposure 
effect. These results were even stronger when we imposed a short deadline on response times 
(Experiment 4). 
We interpreted these findings as reflecting the fact that enhanced fluency, due to pre-
exposure, led to a tendency to respond “possible” for both possible and impossible objects in 
the object decision task (which can be opposed for impossible objects by analytic processes 
that act to produce the correct “impossible” answer). This same fluency might be attributed 
also to object pleasantness in the liking task and to object familiarity in the recognition task. 
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Along these lines, several authors have argued that perceptual fluency plays an important role 
in various decision tasks and produces various subjective feelings, such as liking (e.g., 
Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992; Seamon et al., 1983a,b), recognition (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; 
Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980; Rajaram, 1993; Verfaellie & Cermak, 1999), but also 
duration (Masson & Caldwell, 1998), truth (Begg & Armour, 1991; Reber & Schwarz, 1999), 
normative word frequency (Toth & Daniels, 2002), and stimulus clarity (Goldinger, Kleider, 
& Shelley, 1999). According to the fluency-attribution heuristic developed over the last 20 
years, these feelings are considered to be based either on the misattribution of enhanced 
fluency to the dimension made salient by the test (e.g., pleasantness, duration judgments) or 
on the correct attribution to the real source of the facilitation (i.e., previous encounter). From 
this perspective, the mere exposure effect constitutes an affective misattribution of enhanced 
fluency due to prior repetition. We suggested that the “possibility” feeling also results from a 
misattribution process. More specifically, according to this fluency-attribution account, if 
participants adopt a non-analytic heuristic, in the sense that they process a stimulus as a whole 
rather than analyzing it by its parts, and if the whole item engenders a feeling of fluent 
processing, then an attribution process is recruited to find a suitable dimension in the 
environment (e.g., possibility, pleasantness, familiarity) to which that fluent processing can be 
attributed. Thus, we do not think that the possibility bias effect is the result of an inevitable 
decision bias to consider a fluent object as possible. Rather, we assume that fluent 
reprocessing at test time resulting from quickly encoded perceptual information about three-
dimensional objects (general configuration of features, Ratcliff & McKoon, 1995; partial 
possible configuration, Williams & Tarr, 1997; category-diagnostic features or whole-based 
information, Marsolek & Burgund, 2005) can produce various feelings such as pleasantness 
(Seamon et al., 1995, 1997), symmetry (Liu & Cooper, 2001), possibility (Marsolek & 
Burgund, 2005; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1995; Williams & Tarr, 1997) and familiarity-based 
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recognition.  
 In addition, regarding the absence of object decision priming for impossible objects, 
this study might reconcile the possibility bias theory (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1995) with another 
point of view developed by Carrasco and Seamon (1996). These authors showed that when 
possible and impossible objects are equated for visual complexity, object decision priming 
occurs for both object types. Thus, the absence of priming might occur when impossible 
objects are visually complex. We suggested that the analytic processing adopted by 
participant in object decision task could be less efficient for complex object rich in details 
whereas non-analytic processing which focuses on global form of object could be not. In 
agreement with this assumption, it has been demonstrated that mere exposure effect which 
depends on global processing is not influenced by complexity of stimuli (Bornstein, 1989). 
Finally, the central question addressed in this article did not concern whether a single 
or a multiple memory store could underlie, on the one hand, object decision priming, the mere 
exposure effect and explicit recognition (see Marsolek & Burgund, 2005; Ratcliff & McKoon, 
1995; Rouder, Ratcliff, & McKoon, 2000; Seamon et al., 1995, 1997; Williams & Tarr, 1997, 
for a more direct approach to these questions) and, on the other hand, view-independent and 
view-dependent performance. Rather, we argued that task requirements may be determining 
in generating different results in studies of implicit and explicit memory performance. We 
suggest that, instead of directly interpreting the nature of potential representations or 
processes from differential performance in different memory tasks, sometimes the question of 
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1. For example, Participant 1: set 1 = studied 0°, set 2 = studied –60°, set 3 = studied 
+120°, set 4 = studied 180°, set 5 to 8 = unstudied distractors; Participant 2: set 7 = 
studied 0°, set 8 = studied +60°, set 5 = studied –120°, set 6 = studied 180°, and set 1 to 4 
= unstudied distractors, etc. 
2. 5 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs [Test Status, Task Order, (counter)clockwise] performed on 
response proportions and RT data in all experiments showed no main effect or interaction 
involving the Task Order or (counter)clockwise factors. Therefore, all the analyses 
reported in this study were performed on data collapsed over the task order and 
(counter)clockwise conditions. 
3. Mean RTs for possible objects were 944, 1266, 1263, 1276, and 1266 ms in the 0° , 60° , 
120°, 180° , and unstudied items respectively. Mean RTs for impossible objects were 1251, 
1259, 1279, 1240, and 1263 ms. Anova showed a significant main Test Status effect and a 
significant Test Status × Object Type interaction (respectively, F(4, 188) = 23.283, p 
<.001; F(4, 188) = 16.398, p <.001), but no significant main Object Type effect (F < 2). 
4. Full instructions used for Experiments 2 and 3 are available at 
www.ulg.ac.be/neuropsy/mere exposure effect. 
5. Mean RTs for possible objects were 1029, 1033, 1041, 1070, and 1083 ms in the 0°, 60°, 
120°, 180° , and unstudied items respectively. Mean RTs for impossible objects were 1064, 
1073, 1061, 1081, and 1086 ms. ANOVA showed a significant main effect for Test Status, a 
slight but non-significant Object Type effect, and no Test Status × Object Type interaction 
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Figure 1. Examples of stimuli used in the experiments. The left figure depicts a possible 
object; the right figure depicts an impossible object for studied objects as function of 
rotation and for unstudied objects (distractors). 











Table 1.       
Accuracy rates in object decision task (OD), Reaction Times un object decision task 
(OD RTs) and Recognition responses proportion (REC) for studied objects and for 
unstudied objects. 
 Studied Objects   
Task Type 0° 60° 120° 180° 
Unstudied 
Objects 
OD   
Possible .89 (.14) .81 (.17) .83 (.17) .84 (.14) .80 (.16) 
Impossible .77 (.18) .77 (.21) .79 (.22) .78 (.19) .80 (.16) 
OD RTs 
 Possible 943 (206) 1266 (247) 1262 (236) 1276 (211) 1265 (247) 
 Impossible 1251 (226) 1258 (237) 1278 (239) 1252 (262) 1262 (180) 
REC   
Possible .83 (.22) .65 (.22) .66 (.21) .63 (.23) .34 (.22) 
Impossible .80 (.24) .65 (.23) .64 (.22) .62 (.23) .28 (.25) 




Means of Liked objects (LIK) and Recognition (REC) responses proportion for studied objects 
as function of rotation and for unstudied objects (distractors). 
  Studied Objects  
Task Type 0° 60° 120° 180° Distractors 
LIK Possible .60 (.27) .50 (.20) .47 (.27) .50 (.16) .41 (.16) 
 Impossible .53 (.21) .50 (.31) .46 (.25) .52 (.21) .37 (.15) 
REC Possible .84 (.22) .63 (.22) .66 (.22) .65 (.23) .33 (.18) 
 Impossible .89 (.21) .68 (.20) .69 (.23) .66 (.24) .33 (.18) 




Means of Liked objects (LIK) and non-analytic recognition (No REC) responses proportion for 
studied objects as function of rotation and for unstudied objects (distractors). 
  Studied Objects   
Task Type 0° 60° 120° 180° Distractors 
LIK Possible .63 (.28) .54 (.25) .45 (.25) .52 (.33) .36 (.27) 
 Impossible .57 (.31) .55 (.26) .47 (.30) .54 (.34) .41 (.27) 
No REC Possible .70 (.27) .66 (.27) .65 (.28) .70 (.20) .34 (.25) 
 Impossible .65 (.28) .69 (.25) .63 (.26) .66 (.18) .33 (.26) 
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
 
 Table 4 
Means of analytic liking (An LIK) and recognition (An REC) responses proportion for studied 
objects as function of rotation and for unstudied objects (distractors). 
 Studied Objects  
Task Type 0° 60° 120° 180° Distractors 
An LIK Possible .58 (.32) .40 (.27) .45 (.35) .43 (.23) .43 (.29) 
 Impossible .58 (.29) .38 (.30) .41 (.30) .40 (.31) .40 (.31) 
An REC Possible .84 (.18) .68 (.27) .59 (.27) .45 (.34) .29 (.26) 
 Impossible .87 (.17) .73 (.23) .64 (.28) .48 (.37) .35 (.36) 
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Table 5      
Means of correct responses proportion in non-analytic Object Decision task (No  OD) and 
non-analytic Recognition (No REC) responses proportion for studied objects as function of 
rotation and for unstudied objects (distractors). 
 Studied Object   
Task Type 0° 60° 120° 180° Distractors 
No OD 
Possible .73 (.13) .72 (.15) .72 (.14) .70 (.10) .60 (.10) 
Impossible .58 (.20) .60 (.18) .61 (.23) .62 (.23) .68 (.15) 
No REC  
Possible .67 (.23) .65 (.22) .66 (.22) .66 (.24) .29 (.24) 
Impossible .65 (.24) .68 (.26) .63 (.24) .63 (.23) .23 (.24) 
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 6      
Means of correct responses proportion in Object Decision task (OD) and Recognition (REC) 
responses proportion for studied objects as function of rotation and for unstudied objects 
(distractors). 
 Studied Object   
Task Type 0° 60° 120° 180° Distractors 
OD 
Possible .74 (.11) .73 (.15) .74 (.11) .74 (.09) .64 (.09) 
Impossible .55 (.15) .55 (.15) .53 (.24) .54 (.15) .68 (.14) 
REC  
Possible .68 (.23) .64 (.21) .60 (.26) .64 (.23) .30 (.27) 
Impossible .66 (.25) .63 (.25) .61 (.22) .60 (.22) .24 (.22) 
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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